In 1936, Stanislaw Jaśkowski [1] gave a construction of an interesting sequence J0, J1, . . . of what he called "matrices", which we would today call "finite Heyting Algebras". He then gave a very brief sketch of a proof that if a propositional formula holds in every Ji then it is provable in intuitionistic propositional logic (IPL). The sketch just describes a certain normal form for propositional formulas and gives a very terse outline of an inductive argument showing that an unprovable formula in the normal form can be refuted in one of the J k . Unfortunately, it is far from clear how to recover a complete proof from this sketch.
Let H = (H, f, t, ⊓, ⊔, →) be a Heyting algebra. We will define Γ(H) to be an extension of H as a (f, t, ⊓, →)-algebra that adds a new co-atom (i.e., a new element * such that x < * < t for x ∈ H \ {t}) and preserves as many joins as possible. To do this, we choose some object * = * H that is not an element of H and let Γ(H) = (H ∪ { * }, f, t, ⊓, ⊔, →), where the operations ⊓, ⊔ and → are derived from those of H as shown in the operation tables below, in which x and y range over H \ {t} and where α : H → (H \ {t}) ∪ { * } satisfies α(x) = x for x = t and α(t) = * . ⊓ y * t x x ⊓ y x x * y * * t y * t ⊔ y * t x α(x ⊔ y) * t * * * t t t t t → y * t x x → y t t * y t t t y * t Let B be the two-element Heyting algebra and, as usual, let us write H i for the i-fold power of a Heyting algebra H. Then define a sequence J 0 , J 1 , . . . of finite Heyting algebras as follows:
We take the language L of intuitionistic propositional calculus, IPL, to be constructed from a set V = {P 1 , P 2 , . . .} of variables, the constants ⊥, ⊤, and the binary connectives ∧, ∨ and ⇒. We do not take negation as primitive: ¬A is an abbreviation for A ⇒ ⊥. The metavariables A, B, . . . , M (possibly with subscripts) range over formulas. E and F are reserved for formulas that are either variables or ⊥. P, Q, . . . , Z range over variables. We assume known one of the many ways of defining the logic of IPL and write IPL ⊢ A, if A is provable in IPL. IPL has an algebraic semantics in which, given a Heyting algebra H and an interpretation I : V → H, we extend I to a mapping v I : L → H by interpreting ⊥, ⊤, ∧, ∨ and ⇒ as f, t, ⊓, ⊔ and → respectively. As usual we write I |= A if v I (A) = t, H |= A if I |= A for every interpreation I : V → H and |= A if H |= A for every Heyting algebra H. We assume known the fact that IPL is sound with respect to this semantics in the sense that, if IPL ⊢ A, then |= A. The converse statement, i.e., the completeness of IPL with respect to the semantics is well-known, but we do not use it: in fact we will give an alternative to the usual proofs.
We write A ⇔ B for (A ⇒ B) ∧ (B ⇒ A) and A[B/X] for the result of substituting B for each occurrence of X in A. We have the following substitution lemma:
Lemma 1 (substitution) For any formulas A, B and C and any variable X we have:
Proof: (i) is proved by induction on a proof of C.
(ii) is proved by induction on the structure of C. We say a formula A is reduced if ⊤ does not appear in A as the operand of any connective and ⊥ does not appear in A as the operand of any connective other than as the right-hand operand of ⇒. Thus the only reduced formula containing ⊤ is ⊤ itself.
Lemma 2 Any formula is equivalent to a reduced formula.
Proof: This follows by repeated use of the substitution lemma and the provable equivalences ⊤ ∧ A ⇔ A, ⊥ ∧ A ⇔ ⊥ etc.
We define a formula to be basic if it is reduced and is either a variable or has one of the forms P ⇒ A or A ⇒ P where P is a variable and A contains at most one connective. Thus a basic formula has one of the following forms 1 .
Note that if A is basic formula of a form other than P , (P ⇒ Q) ⇒ R or ¬P ⇒ Q, then V I (A) = t in any Heyting algebra under the interpretation I that maps every variable to f. Our convention for the metavariables E and F allows us to write, for example, (P ⇒ E) ⇒ R as a metanotation for the forms (P ⇒ Q) ⇒ R and ¬P ⇒ R.
We say a formula is a basic context if it is reduced and is a conjunction of one or more pairwise distinct basic formulas. We say a formula is regular if it is an implication K ⇒ F where K is a basic context (and following our convention F is a variable or ⊥).
We say A and B are equiprovable and write
Lemma 3 Every formula A is equiprovable with a regular formula M ⇒ Z such that if H is any Heyting algebra and I is an interpretation in H with
Proof: By Lemma 2, we may assume A is reduced. If A is ⊤, let Z be any variable and let M :≡ Z, then A and M ⇒ Z are both provable and hence they are equiprovable. If A is ⊥, take M and Z to be distinct variables, then neither A nor M ⇒ Z is provable, and hence they are equiprovable. Otherwise, chose some variable Z that does not occur in A. Then it is easy to see that A ⊣⊢ (A ⇒ Z) ⇒ Z (for the right-to-left direction, use the substitution lemma to substitute A for Z). Our plan is to replace K :≡ A ⇒ Z by a basic context by "unnesting" all its non-atomic subformulas. Assume K contains k non-atomic subformulas. Starting with
is atomic and is P j if B i is the j-th non-atomic subformula; H i is C i if C i is atomic and is P j if C i is the j-th non-atomic subformula. Now define formulas L and M as follows:
, and using the fact that A and hence K are reduced, we see that M is a basic context, so M ⇒ Z is regular.
We must show that K ⇒ Z ⊣⊢ M ⇒ Z. To see this, first assume IPL ⊢ K ⇒ Z. By induction on the size of the
Using the substitution lemma, we have also that
To prove M ⇒ Z satisfies the requirement about interpretations, assume I is an interpretation such that
and hence, (by induction on the size of the A i ) that V I (P i ) = V I (A i ). In particular, V I (P 1 ) = V I (A 1 ) and since we also have V I (P 1 ) = t, we must have
We now state and prove three lemmas whose purpose will become clear at their point of use in the proof of our main theorem, Theorem 7.
Lemma 4 If B is a basic formula that is not of the form P or P ⇒ Q ∨ R and P occurs in B, then IPL ⊢ P ∧ B ⇔ P ∧ C where C has fewer connective occurrences than B and is either a basic formula, an atom or a basic context comprising a conjunction of two variables.
Proof: Routine using the fact that IPL ⊢ P ∧ B ⇔ P ∧ B[⊤/P ] (which may be proved for arbitrary B by induction on the structure of B).
Proof: ⇒: easy using IPL ⊢ C ⇒ ((A ⇒ B) ⇒ C). ⇐: the following gives the highlights of the natural deduction proof.
Lemma 6 Let B be a basic formula that is not a variable and let I be an interpretation in a non-trivial Heyting algebra H such that V I (B) = t. Let α :
(ii) If B has the form (P ⇒ E) ⇒ R, and if in addition V I (P ) = V I (E ⇒ R) = t while V I (E) = t, then also V J (B) = t.
Proof: (i): This is easily checked for the case P ⇒ E and for the cases P • Q ⇒ R and P ⇒ Q • R when • ∈ {∧, ∨}. In the remaining case B ≡ P ⇒ Q ⇒ E. As B is equivalent to P ∧ Q ⇒ E, we have already covered the case when E is a variable, while if E is ⊥, V J (B) = α(p)⊓α(q) → f, where p = I(P ) and q = I(Q), but then, by inspection of the operation tables, we have α(p) ⊓ α(q) = p ⊓ q unless p = q = t, but as H is non-trivial and V I (B) = t, the case p = q = t cannot arise.
(ii): we have V J (B) = (α(p) → α(e)) → α(r), where p = V I (P ), e = V I (E) and r = V I (R). By assumption, p = t and e = t, so α(p) = * and α(e) = e, hence α(p) → α(e) = * → e = e, so that V J (B) = e → α(r) which is e → * = t, if r = t, and is e → r otherwise, in which case, as we are given that V I (E ⇒ R) = t, we have e → r = V I (E ⇒ R) = t.
To state our main theorem, we define an interpretation I to be a strong refutation of a formula of the form K ⇒ C, if V I (K) = t while V I (C) = t. Case (i): v(A) = d(A) = 0: in this case, the interpretation in J 0 = B that maps every variable to f is easily seen to be a strong refutation of A (which is therefore unprovable, by the soundness of IPL).
Case (ii): v(A) > 0: in this case at least one B i is a variable. If all the B i are variables and if B i ≡ F for any i, then A has strong refutation such that I(B i ) = t, i = 1, . . . , k and I(F ) = f. Otherwise, rearranging the B i if necessary, we may assume that K ≡ P ∧ L where P is a variable and L ≡ B 2 ∧ . . . ∧ B k . If P ≡ F , we are done: F ∧ L ⇒ F is provable. If P ≡ F and P does not occur in L, then it is easy to see that A ⊣⊢ A ′ where A ′ :≡ L ⇒ F . As s(A ′ ) < s(A), by induction, if IPL ⊢ L ⇒ F , we can find a strong refutation I of L ⇒ F , but then, because P does not occur in L ⇒ F , by adjusting I if necessary to map P to t we obtain a strong refutation of A. If P occurs in L, let us rearrange the B i again so that K ≡ P ∧ B ∧ M where M ≡ B 3 , . . . , B k and P occurs in B. If B does not have the form P ⇒ Q ∨ R, then, by Lemma 4, we may replace P ∧ B by an equivalent formula P ∧ C where C is either a basic formula, an atom or a basic context comprising a conjunction of two variables and contains fewer connectives then B. If C is ⊥, A is provable and we are done. Otherwise, we may replace A by the equivalent regular formula Case ( 
We now have two subcases depending on the provability of the formulas
Subcase (iii)(a): for some i ∈ X, IPL ⊢ C i : By Lemma 5, A, which is equivalent to
But then applying Lemma 6 to I gives us an intepretation
Corollary 8 Let A ≡ K ⇒ F be a regular formula and let d be the number of conjuncts of K of the form
Proof: Immediate from the theorem given the soundness of IPL for the Heyting algebra semantics.
Corollary 9 IPL is complete for the Heyting algebra semantics.
Proof: Assume |= A. We have to show that IPL ⊢ A. Consider the regular formula A ′ ≡ M ⇒ Z such that A ⊣⊢ A ′ whose existence is given by Lemma 3. If IPL ⊢ A, then IPL ⊢ A ′ , whence by the theorem, A ′ has a strong refutation in J k for some k, i.e., an interpretation I in J k such that V I (M ) = t, but V I (Z) < t. But then Lemma 3 gives us that V I (A) ≤ V I (Z) < t, so I |= A contradicting our assumption that |= A.
Corollary 10 IPL has the finite model property.
Proof: It is immediate from the theorem and soundness that a refutable regular formula has a refutation in a finite model. Argue as in the proof of Corollary 9 to reduce the general case to the case of regular formulas.
If H 0 , H 1 , . . . is a sequence of Heyting algebras, let us define k H k to be the subalgebra of k H k comprising sequences (p 0 , p 1 , . . .) such that for all sufficiently large k, the p k are either all f or all t. Our final corollary shows that there is countably infinite Heyting algebra J, such that for any formula φ, J |= φ iff IPL ⊢ φ. 
Proof:
The left-to-right direction is just the soundness of IPL for Heyting algebras. For the right-to-left direction argue as in the proof of Corollary 9 and note that a refutation in J d gives a refutation in the subalgebra of J comprising the sequences (p 0 , p 1 , . . .) such that p i is constant for i > d.
The statement of Theorem 7 leads to a decision procedure for IPL that involves a search through all interpretations of a formula in one of the J d for a certain d. As Rose [4] observes, the size of the J k grows very rapidly with k, so this decision procedure is impractical. However, the proof of the theorem leads to a much better algorithm: given any formula A, we first apply the algorithm of Lemma 3 if necessary to convert A into an equiprovable regular formula and then follow the case analysis of the proof: if we are in Case (i), A is unprovable and we are done; if we are in Case (ii), the proof shows us how to produce one or two simpler formulas whose conjunction is equivalent to A and we may proceed recursively to decide these formulas; if we are in Case (iii), we can derive the formulas C i described in the proof and decide them recursively; if any C i is provable, we are in Subcase (iii)(a) and we may replace A by an equivalent and simpler formula that we can decide recursively; if no C i is provable, we are in Subcase (iii)(b) and A is unprovable. In the appendix, we show some example calculations using this decision procedure.
The proof of Theorem 7 and in particular its use of Lemma 5 is largely due to Rose [3, 4] . Rose's analogue of our basic formulas admits only 6 forms: P , ¬P , P ⇒ Q, P ⇒ Q ∨ R, P ∧ Q ⇒ R and (P ⇒ Q) ⇒ R). To prove his analogue of our Lemma 3 involves a lengthy case analysis, whereas our more liberal notion of basic formula admits the simpler and more intuitive proof given here. As far as I know, the observations that the main theorem leads to an alternative proof of the completeness of IPL and that its proof leads to a practical decision procedure for IPL are new.
Appendix: examples of the decision procedure
Throughout the examples "Case" and "Subcase" refer to the proof of Theorem 7. We use the following tabular format for regular formulas A ≡ B 1 ∧ . . . B k ⇒ F occurring as the goals we are trying to decide:
Noting that A already has the form B ⇒ Q, we can skip the first step in the algorithm of Lemma 3 and simply "unnest" B. Listing the subformulas of (P ∨ 2 Q) ∧ 1 ¬ 3 Q as shown by the subscripts, our initial goal is:
We are in Case (ii) and we replace the occurrence of P 1 in P 1 ⇔ P 2 ∧ P 3 by ⊤ and simplify giving;
We are again in Case (ii), but now P 2 appears in a subformula of the form P 2 ⇒ P ∨ Q and replacing P 2 by ⊤ in that formula gives us two subgoals: P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P, P 3 ⇔ ¬Q P P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , Q, P 3 ⇔ ¬Q P Both subgoals are in Case (ii). In the first, the succedent of the goal appears in the antecedent while in the second, replacing first P 3 and then Q by ⊤ in P 3 ⇔ ¬Q and simplifying gives the antecedent ⊥. So in both cases, the subgoals and hence our original formula are provable.
Example 2: Peirce's law:
A is already regular, so we take it as our initial goal:
(P ⇒ Q) ⇒ P P
We are in Case (iii) and our next step is to decide the goal:
This is in Case (ii) and replacing P by ⊤ in Q ⇒ P and simplifying leads to P Q This is again in Case (ii) and is refuted by the interpretation {P → t, Q → f}. Following Lemma 6, this lifts to the refutation {P → * , Q → f} of Peirce's law in J 1 = B ∪ { * }.
Example 3: prelinearity: A :≡ (P ⇒ Q) ∨ (Q ⇒ P )
Following the first part of Lemma 3, we replace A by the equiprovable formula (A ⇒ Z) ⇒ Z and list its subformulas as indicated by the subscripts in ((P ⇒ 3 Q) ∨ 2 (Q ⇒ 4 P ) ⇒ 1 Z) ⇒ Z. This gives us the following initial goal:
This is in Case (ii) and replacing P 1 by ⊤ in P 1 ⇔ P 2 ⇒ Z and simplifying we get: P 1 , P 2 ⇒ Z, P 2 ⇔ P 3 ∨ P 4 , P 3 ⇔ P ⇒ Q, P 4 ⇔ (Q ⇒ P ) Z This is now in Case (iii) with d = 2. This leads to two subgoals:
C 1 : P 1 , P 2 ⇒ Z, P 2 ⇔ P 3 ∨ P 4 , P 3 ⇒ P ⇒ Q, P 4 ⇔ (Q ⇒ P ), P, Q ⇒ P 3 Q C 2 : P 1 , P 2 ⇒ Z, P 2 ⇔ P 3 ∨ P 4 , P 3 ⇔ P ⇒ Q, P 4 ⇒ (Q ⇒ P ), Q, P ⇒ P 4 P Either continuing to follow Theorem 7 or by inspection, we find the following strong refutations of these subgoals in B.
C 1 : ({P, P 1 , P 2 , P 4 , Z} × {t}) ∪ ({Q, P 3 } × {f}) C 2 : ({Q, P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , Z} × {t}) ∪ ({P, P 4 } × {f})
Combining these we should obtain a refutation I = {P → (t, f), Q → (f, t)} of A in Γ(B 2 ) ⊆ J 2 . And, indeed, in Γ(B 2 ) we have:
((t, f) → (f, t)) ⊔ ((f, t) → (t, f)) = (f, t) ⊔ (t, f) = α((f, t) ⊔ B 2 (t, f)) = α((t, t)) = * = t.
